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PREFACE 
The Netherlands case study is part of the project "Social Security, Family and Household 
in Aging Societies," conducted at IIASA in collaboration with the Netherlands 
Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI). 
Other papers related to the project are listed below: 
CP-91-002 Demographic Changes and their Implications on Some Aspects of Social 
Security in the Unified Germany, by N. Ott, T. Biittner, and H.P. Galler 
WP-90-22 Socio-Demographic Changes and the Pension Problem in Austria, by J.- 
P. Gonnot 
WP-90-15 Demographic, Social and Economic Aspects of the Pension Problem: 
Evidence from Twelve Countries, by J.-P. Gonnot 
WP-89-107 Pension Systems and Social Security Trends and National Characteristics, 
by J.-P. Gonnot and C. Prinz 
WP-89-34 Recent Trends in Living Arrangements in Fourteen Industrialized 
Countries, by J.-P. Gonnot and B. Vukovich 

ABSTRACT 
Projections of expenditures for old-age pensions, survivor pensions, and disability 
pensions were made for the period 1985-2050 on the basis of future developments in the 
population structure by age, sex, and marital status. Five demographic scenarios were 
formulated: (i) a Benchmark scenario, with demographic rates kept constant at  their 
1980-84 level; (ii) a Fertility scenario, with a rise of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 
towards replacement level; (iii) a Mortality scenario, with reductions in mortality rates 
of 30 percent for females, and 45 percent for males; (iv) a Western scenario, which 
combines extreme demographic conditions of several West European countries: a TFR 
of 1.28, proportions never-marrying of one-third, one-third of all marriages ending in 
divorce, and male and female life expectancies of 74 and 81 years, respectively; and a ,  
Realistic scenario, which is the only one to include international migration, and which 
corresponds closely to the official population forecasts for the Netherlands. 
Two pension scenarios and two labor market scenarios were combined with the 
demographic scenarios. The current pension system, with its flat benefit rate, was 
combined with all five demographic scenarios. Also, the consequences of the system 
which was in use in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1985 were traced. Finally, the 
impact of high female labor force participation, and a rise in the average age at 
retirement were investigated. 
The results indicate that changes in demographic conditions (e.g. a fertility rise, or a 
persistent influx of immigrants) cannot prevent increases in and funding problems for 
pension expenditures in the Netherlands. Linking pension benefits to the labor market 
history of the individuals concerned brings no relief either. However, raising the average 
age at retirement would, to a large extent, avoid funding problems for old-age pensions 
for a great deal, with a large amount of overfunding in the short run. 
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1. Demographic Trends in the Netherlands Since 1950: A Short Review 
As in most other Western countries, tremendous demographic changes took place in the 
Netherlands after the Second World War. These changes were brought about by altered 
socioeconomic and sociocultural conditions, and at the same time they had an impact on 
the socioeconomic and the sociocultural structure of the population in the Netherlands. 
Between the 1950s and the 1980s, fertility levels dropped strongly, and life expectancies 
witnessed a temporary reversal (in particular for adult males) of an otherwise continuous 
increase. The Netherlands turned from an emigration country, with a surplus of labor 
force in the 1950s, into a country with labor immigration from Mediterranean countries 
at the end of the 1960s, and large flows of immigrants from former Dutch colonies 
(Indonesia, Surinam) at irregular points in time (1950, 1958, 1962, 1975, 1980). 
Furthermore, marriage was increasingly delayed, while consensual unions became more 
and more accepted as a preparation for, and sometimes even as an alternative to, 
marriage. Hence growing proportions of young adults remained unmarried. The numbers 
of divorces rose strongly, in particular after a change in legislation in 1971. These general 
trends have been documented by several authors (e.g. De Beer, 1989), and they agree 
remarkably well with the overall demographic trends in the Western world (Van de Kaa, 
1987). 
The character of family formation changed drastically in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
traditional family, which resulted from early marriage and a short first birth interval, was 
gradually replaced by a different type of family, of which the parents had first lived in 
consensual union before the formal marriage took place, in which fewer children were 
born, and which experienced higher dissolution risks due to divorce than due to 
widowhood. The traditional ("bourgeois") family lost more and more of its importance, 
and a new type of family, in which self-realization and individual values were more 
prominent, came into being. Emancipation, education and labor force participation of 
women played a key-role in the downward trend in fertility. 
To illustrate fertility trends, Figure 1' shows how the Total Fertility Rate fell from a high 
level of between 3 and 3.2 in the 1950s, to a historically low of around 1.5 in the 1980s.~ 
This figure illustrates also that until the mid-1970s, marital fertility was lower than total 
fertility. As marriage and childbearing were nearly universal, extramarital fertility was 
mostly unintended, and it just came on top of marital fertility. However, the situation 
changed in the 1970s, when fewer persons married (the Period Total First Marriage Rate 
dropped from 95 percent for the years 1950-1970, to some 75 percent for the second half 
of the 1980s). Couples who wanted a child generally married, while those who wished to 
stay childless (proportions are estimated to be 15 percent for the females born in 1950, 
and 20 percent for the 1960 cohort) remained unmarried. Thus, marriage acted as a filter 
to distinguish between couples with and without children, and this explains why marital 
fertility is higher than overall fertility. Yet, as Figure 2 demonstrates, childbearing 
outside wedlock gained considerable momentum around 1975. The character of 
extramarital fertility changed in the 1960s from largely unintended to planned behavior. 
Initial rises which took place in the 1960s may be due to a combination of two factors: 
society became more liberal towards sexual activity outside marriage, but at the same 
time non-married couples had limited access to contraception and abortion. The latter 
factor disappeared around 1970, and a few years later an extramarital child was no 
longer a taboo. The percentage of extramarital births has risen to over 10 percent; for 
first births the percentage born outside wedlock is even 15. Yet these figures are very low 
compared to those found in Sweden and Denmark. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
about one-third of the unmarried mothers in the Netherlands nowadays marry within a 
few years after the birth of their child. 
Some trends in marriage and marriage dksolution can be observed from Table 1. Marriage 
was popular in the Netherlands until 1970. Between 1950 and 1970, a stable proportion 
of around 95 percent of males and females married at some age, and the increase in the 
numbers of marriages was due to two factors: the growth of the young population, and 
the fall in the mean age at marriage. But towards the end of the 1960s, attitudes with 
respect to formal marriage started to change, and the number of marriages dropped by 
more than one-third between 1970 and 1983. Many young adults postponed marriage, as 
can be seen from the rising age at first marriage. Moreover, the (period) percentage 
ever-marrying fell to less than 80 percent. Much of the changes are due to cohabitation 
before marriage, as is demonstrated by Table 2. 
l ~ i ~ u r e s  applying to years up to 1985, unless indicated otherwise, were taken from various sources 
published by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, in particular several issues of the Monll~ly 
Bullelin of Populaliort Slatistics, and the publication 1899-1989: Negentig Jaren Statistiek in Tijdreeksen. 
%he line for marital live births in Figure 1 was calculated on the basis of the sum of marriage 
duration-specific birth rates (relative to the size of the marriage cohort) for durations 0, 1, 2, ..., 20+, 
rearranged by calendar year. 
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Figure 1. Average number of children per woman (period perspective). 
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Figure 2. Extramarital births per thousand live births. 
Table 1. Marriage and marriage dissolution, 1950-1989. 
Crude marriage rate 8.3 7.6 9.3 6.4 5.7 6.1 
Mean age at first marriage 
Males 28.1 26.8 24.8 25.5 26.3 28.3 
Females 25.7 24.5 22.9 23.2 24.0 26.0 
Number of divorces per 3.0 2.2 3.3 7.5 9.9 8.2 
1000 married women 
Table 2. Percentage of women living in a union, by age. 
Formally married Cohabiting or married 
21-24 25-29 30-37 21-24 25-29 30-37 
Consensual unions are largely considered as a trial marriage in the Netherlands. The 
1988 Fertility Survey revealed that of all women aged 25-29 who married in the mid- 
1980s, no less than 80 percent lived in a consensual union before the marriage took 
place. When the woman becomes pregnant, or when the couple plans to have a child, the 
union is often legalized. Two-thirds of the unmarried young persons who were 
interviewed in the 1984 life-style survey in the Netherlands stated that the (planned) 
birth of a child would be a reason for them to marry. 
Divorce showed a steady rise after 1965, and an acceleration took place when legislation 
was changed in 1971 (see Figure 3). But suddenly, in 1985, the trend came to an end, 
and divorce in the period 1986-1989 was 10-15 percent lower than in 1985. If age-specific 
divorce rates as observed in 1989 would remain the same for the next 60 years, some 23 
percent of the married women would ever face a divorce. On the basis of the 1985 
divorce rates the proportion would be 27 percent. Diminishing numbers of married 
couples at divorce-prone ages are only a partial explanation of this sudden trend reversal. 
Marriages which took place after previous cohabitation may be assumed to be more 
stable than marriages in the 1970s, but empirical evidence shows that divorce rates also 
went down for those couples who did not cohabit. Thus the recent drop in divorce in the 
Netherlands is an unresolved issue. 
Figure 3. Divorces. 
Mortality trends are characterized by a steady increase in life chances for females, and 
a temporary rise in mortality rates for males at adult ages in the 1960s (Table 3). The 
diverging trends for females and males caused a larger gap between the sexes in the life 
expectancy at birth: from 2.3 years in 1950 to 6.8 years in 1980. After 1980, death rates 
for males at medium ages decreased more strongly than those of females, and this 
resulted in a slight reduction of the gap between the sexes. Another consequence was 
that the female life expectancy at birth follows a cyclical pattern around an upward slope: 
the increase was strong in the 1950s (2.4 years) and 1970s (2.7 years), and much weaker 
in the 1960s (1.2 years) and 1980s (approximately 0.8 years). Lung cancer became a more 
prominent death cause for females in the 1980s, although death rates specific to this 
particular cause are still considerably lower than for males. 
Table 3. Mortality, 1950-1989. 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1985 1989 
Males 
Life expectancy (years) 
at birth 70.6 71.5 70.7 72.5 73.1 73.7 
at age 60 17.8 17.7 17.1 17.4 17.6 17.9 
Survivors (per 100 born) 
at age 80 33.6 34.9 32.0 33.4 34.2 36.4 
Females 
Life expectancy (years) 
at birth 72.9 75.3 76.5 79.2 79.7 80.0 
at age 60 18.6 19.5 20.5 22.5 22.8 23.0 
Survivors (per 100 born) 
at age 80 37.9 44.0 49.2 58.1 59.8 60.9 
2. The Future Population Structure: Five Demographic Scenarios 
In order to trace the consequences for social security of future population trends in the 
Netherlands, five demographic scenarios were set up for the period 1985-2050. The first 
four scenarios are common to all countries participating in the project. In summary: 
1. The Benchmark scenario, with age-specific rates for fertility, mortality, marriage and 
marriage dissolution constant at the levels observed during 1980-1984 in the 
Netherlands. 
2. The Fertility scenario in which it is assumed that fertility in the Netherlands will 
gradually increase from its 1980-1984 level of 1.51 children per woman to 
replacement level (TFR = 2.1) in the period 2000-2004. 
3. The hfortality scenario, with a gradual decrease by 30 percent of female mortality 
rates, and one by 45 percent of the rates for males. It is equivalent to an increase 
of 8 years in the life expectancy of males, and about 5.3 years for females. Thus the 
existing seven-year gap between male and female life expectancy would be reduced 
to approximately 4.7 years. 
4. The Western low scenario, which combines the most extreme demographic conditions 
presently observed in Western Europe: a TFR of 1.28 (cf. the FRG), proportions 
never-marrying of one-third (cf. Sweden), one-third of all marriages ending in 
divorce (Sweden), and life expectancies of 74 and 81 years for men and women, 
respectively (Switzerland). 
All changes gradually take place over the period between 1985 and 2005. International 
migration is ignored in these four scenarios. 
Not all scenarios are equally plausible for the Netherlands. In fact, all are, to a certain 
extent, rather extreme. International migration is excluded altogether. As to the 
Benchmark scenario, we can be certain that demographic conditions will not be constant 
during the years until 2050. An increase in fertility rates to replacement level as assumed 
in the Fertility scenario is very unlikely, at least for the next few decades. Completed 
cohort fertility has decreased continuously over the past twenty years. It was around 2.7 
for women born in 1930, and it is estimated to .be 1.8 for the cohorts born around 1960. 
This is still higher than the level which is expected by the Netherlands Central Bureau 
of Statistics (NCBS) for the women born in 1985 or later (1.65 in the medium variant). 
Taking uncertainty variants into account, the NCBS expects the TFR to be between 1.45 
and 1.85 (low variant and high variant) from the year 2000 onwards. As to the Mortality 
scenario, the increases in life expectancy which are assumed here are not improbable, 
but they will certainly take place over a much longer period than the twenty years which 
is taken in this scenario. As with the Western scenario, the other three scenarios 
represent, each in their own respect, the extremes of a trajectory that the population 
structure in the Netherlands is likely to follow in the future. How far the actual trends 
will be lying from these extremes is difficult to say. The scenarios represent possible 
futures of which the likelihood may be assumed to be smaller than that of the fifth 
scenario. 
The Realistic scenario, which corresponds closely to the medium variant of the 
official national population forecast of the Netherlands as compiled by the 
Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (NCBS) in 1989 (see Cruijsen, 1990). The 
Realistic scenario excludes extreme trends, as demographic developments are 
extrapolated smoothly into the future. It involves slight increases in fertility (from 
1.51 for the TFR in 1985 to 1.65 in the year 2010); an improvement in mortality 
(for males, the life expectancy at birth rises from 73.1 in 1985 to 75.0 in 2010, and 
for females from 80.5 to 81.6 between those years); rising divorce (30 percent of the 
marriages ending in divorce by 2010); and small decreases in marriage propensities 
(64 percent of the males and 70 percent of the females remain unmarried in 2010). 
The population gain due to international migration decreases somewhat from the 
1985 level of 25,000 immigrants (net-immigration!) to a level of 20,000 in 1995. 
Demographic indicators are kept constant at the level they were given in the last 
year of the transition period. 
Table 4 shows that aging is certain in the Netherlands: in all five scenarios we notice an 
increase in the proportion of the population aged 60 and over in conjunction with a drop 
in total population size. This phenomenon is already present before the year 2015 in the 
Western scenario with its low fertility and zero migration, and appears 15 years later in 
the Fertility and the Realistic scenarios. When the five scenarios are mutually compared, 
the Fertility scenario produces the most extreme effects in many respects: for all years 
shown in the table, proportions aged 6 0 t  are smallest and proportions below 15 are 
highest. High fertility rates bring about larger population sizes than low mortality rates. 
However, compared with the Realistic scenario, the population grows at a rather slow 
pace in the Fertility scenario during the first few decades. In the short run, immigration 
has more impact on total population size than increased fertility levels. But in the long 
run the situation reverses, when the transition period for rising fertility levels comes to 
an end. 
Table 4. Population by broad age-groups, the Netherlands, 1950-2050. 
Percentage in age-groups Tot a1 
0-14 15-59 60+ (in 1000) 
Benchmark scenario 
Fertility scenario 
Mortality scenario 
Western scenario 
Realistic scenario 
The strongest growth in the proportion 60 and over occurs in the Mortality scenario: 
around the year 2050, four out of every ten inhabitants of the Netherlands will be at least 
60 years of age. Around 1985 this was the case for only every sixth person. The Fertility 
scenario and the Realistic scenario show a decrease in the proportion 60+ between 2030 
and 2050. At the same time, absolute numbers in these age groups go down in all 
scenarios as a consequence of the small birth generations born after 1964. 
Table 5 shows future dependency ratios for the Netherlands according to the five 
scenarios. Concentrating on ratios for the elderly, we note an upward trend in all 
scenarios, but also a strong divergence of the levels. For instance, in the Mortality 
scenario the old-age dependency ratio (OADR) increases more than three-fold in 65 
years, whereas it "only" doubles in the Fertility scenario. The growth of the OADR is 
particularly strong between 2015 and 2030, when the large post-World War I1 cohorts 
reach pensionable ages. Note the decrease in OADR in the Fertility scenario, occurring 
between 2030 and 2050. 
Table 5. Dependency ratios, the Netherlands, 1985-2050. 
Under 15 
Benchmark 28.4 25.2 20.8 21.8 20.9 
Fertility 28.4 27.6 27.6 30.7 30.8 
Mortality 28.4 25.2 20.6 21.6 20.7 
Western 28.4 24.3 18.1 18.4 17.1 
Realistic 28.4 26.2 22.9 24.6 24.2 
65 or over 
Benchmark 17.6 20.8 27.6 40.6 43.7 
Fertility 17.6 20.8 26.9 36.3 32.1 
Mortality 17.6 21.9 33.0 51.3 60.1 
Western 17.6 20.9 28.5 43.7 51.7 
Realistic 17.6 20.6 27.2 38.5 39.5 
Total 
Benchmark 46.0 46.0 48.4 62.4 64.6 
Fertility 46.0 48.4 54.5 67.0 62.9 
Mortality 46.0 47.1 53.6 72.9 80.8 
Western 46.0 45.2 46.6 62.1 68.8 
Realistic 46.0 46.8 50.1 63.1 63.7 
The marital composition of population aged 60 and over is shown in Table 6. The 
Fertility scenario was omitted here, because high fertility has only an indirect impact 
(compared to the Benchmark variant) on the marital composition of the elderly (60+) 
for the period until 2045, working through marriage market mechanisms: higher fertility 
rates lead to higher numbers of single males and single females, with stronger 
competition effects in the marriage market. However, as non-married persons aged 60 
and over account for only a small portion of marriages each year, their marital 
composition is hardly influenced until 2 ~ 5 . ~  The results of the Fertility scenario are 
essentially the same as those of the Benchmark scenario. 
The results indicate that proportions married among the elderly will most certainly 
decrease in the future. For females the decline is from 46 percent in 1985 to 25-37 
percent in 2050, while proportions of married males fall by 23 to 35 percentage points, 
depending on the particular scenario. As proportions of widows and widowers will remain 
more or less stable, decreasing shares of married men and women will go together with 
increasing shares of singles and divorced persons. Single males will occupy relatively 
large shares among the elderly, in particular in the Western scenario with its low first- 
marriage propensities. Currently there are much less never-married elderly males than 
widowers (6 percent versus 13 percent), but this situation reverses between 2015 and 
2030, irrespective of the scenario adopted. Because of persistent excess mortality for 
males, future proportions widows will remain larger than proportions of single women, 
but the gap between these two female groups will clearly diminish. 
3~ifferences between the two scenarios in percentages married or single in the age group 60+ 
are limited to 0.2 percent in the year 2050. The consequences of increased numbers of eligible males 
and females are much larger for the medium age groups. For instance, the Fertility scenario leads to 
a decrease in the percentage married among females aged 15-59 (54.8 in the year 2050, as compared 
to 57.9 in the Benchmark scenario). At the same time, proportions single in this age group go up by 
4 percentage points. 
Table 6. Marital composition of the population aged 60 and over, the Netherlands, 1985- 
2050 (in %). 
Females Males 
Single Married Divorced Widowed Total Single Married Divorced Widowed Total 
Benchmark scenario 
Mortality scenario 
Western scenario 
Realistic scenario 
3. Public Old-Age and Survivor Pensions in the Netherlands 
Social security expenditures in the Netherlands amounted to 115 billion Dutch guilders 
(DFI) in 1988 (see Table 7). About 93 billion guilders were spent on social insurance. 
Within the latter group of insurance regulations one may distinguish the so-called 
demographic regulations, which constitute nearly one-third of all social security 
expenditures. These demographic regulations involve old-age state pensions ("Algemene 
Ouderdornswet" or AOW), early retirement schemes ("Vemoegde Uittreding" or W T ) ,  
children's allowances ("Algemene Kinderbijslagwet" or AKW), and survivor pensions 
("Algemene Weduwen- en Wezenwet" or AWW). 
Table 7. Social security expenditures in the Netherlands, 1975-1988 (in billion DF1). 
Total social security* 
Of which: 
social insurance 
social benefits 
Share of total expenditures in 26% 30% 29% 29% 
net national income 
* Excluding supplementary collective pension insurances and regulations. 
Source: Financiele Nota Sociale Zekerheid 1990, p. 152. 
A certain social security scheme falls within the group of demographic regulations when 
its eligibility criterion is a demographic one. For instance, age (for old-age state 
pension/AOW, and for children's allowances/AKW), number and age of the children 
(AKW), age, marital status and number of children under 18 (for survivor 
pension/AWW) are relevant criteria for many of the demographic regulations. Non- 
demographic criteria, such as health and household income or individual income, are 
applied for eligibility assessment of the remaining regulations. The most important 
scheme in the latter group is welfare ("Algemene Bijstandswet" or ABW), which aims at 
ensuring a minimum income level. 
Table 8 shows the development of expenditures for the social security schemes of AOW, 
AWW, AKW and ABW. The increase from DFl21  billion in 1975 to the present level 
of DF1 38 billion is due to a number of factors: demographic (e.g. growth and aging of 
the population, changes in the marital status and household composition), changes in 
eligibility criteria, variations in benefit levels, and inflation. Between 1975 and 1988 the 
population size rose from 13.6 million to nearly 14.7 million persons. The resulting 
average annual population growth rate of 0.6 percent is much lower than the average 
annual growth rate of 4.7 percent for expenditures to the four schemes presented in 
Table 8 for the same period. Hence other demographic factors than population size, and 
non-demographic factors have accounted for the larger share of the growth in 
expenditures. 
Table 8. Expenditures and number of beneficiaries for demographic schemes, the 
Netherlands, 1975-1988 (see text for abbreviations). 
Expenditures Beneficiaries 
(in billion DFI) (in 1000) 
1975 1980 1988 1975 1980 1988 
AOW 11.7 19.4 24.9 1159 1280 1893 
AWW 1.6 2.5 2.9 162 168 195 
AKW 4.4 7.1 5.9 5186~ 4865l 3585l 
AE3w2 3.1 4.5 4.0 229 162 216 
Estimated on the basis of number of households broken down by number of eligible children. 
Old aged-persons homes and "Rijksgroepsregeling Werkloze Werknemers/RWW" excluded. 
Source: Fianciele Nota Sociale Zekerheid 1990, pp. 8-10, 152-155. 
International comparative studies, and studies pertaining to the Netherlands have 
revealed that, generally speaking, the demographic component in expenditures growth 
is less important than the non-demographic component (Heller et al., 1986; Holzmann, 
1987; Nelissen and Vossen, 1984; Van Imhoff and Keilman, forthcoming). Increases in 
real benefits and inflation contribute much more than changes in demographic structure, 
or population growth.4 These findings must be considered in conjunction with the rise 
of the welfare state in the industrialized world since the 1960s. A number of functions 
which were performed by the family and other kin hitherto were increasingly taken over 
by other institutions, in particular the state. Old-age pensions are the most important 
example here, but also welfare. It is far from certain whether future growth in public 
social security expenditures (if at all) will be mainly due to non-demographic factors. 
4 ~ o r  instance, expenditures in the Netherlands for old-age pensions, widow's and orphan's 
allowances, and child allowances rose by some 67 to 85 percent between 1975 and 1982. Non- 
demographic factors accounted for a growth of 60 to 63 percent, and inflation (43 percent) was much 
more important than real growth (12 to 16 percent). Demographic effects (growth in population size, 
changes in age structure and marital status composition) resulted in a growth of 13 and 15 percent for 
old-age pensions and child allowances, respectively, and only 4 percent for widow's and orphan's 
allowances. For OECD countries in the period 1975-1984, the average annual growth rate for public 
expenditures on pensions was 4.7 percent (in real terms - it was 14.7 percent in nominal terms). Of 
this real growth, 1.6 percent was due to demographic effects (changes in population size and age 
structure), 1.5 percent to coverage, and 2.2 percent was accounted for by changing expenditures per 
beneficiary. See Nelissen and Vossen (1984), Van lmhoff and Keilman (forthcoming), and Holzmann 
(1987) for details. 
All social security arrangements in the Netherlands can be classified into three main 
categories. 
1. General social insurances. The arrangements in this category apply to all citizens 
and have been implemented in the form of a compulsory insurance. Premiums are 
levied on all personal income. The general social insurances include: 
- AOW Old-age pensions (compulsory retirement at age 65) 
- AWW Widow's and orphan's allowances 
- AKW Child allowances 
- AAW Disability benefits 
2. Employees' social insurances. These are insurances compulsory for employees only. 
Premiums are levied on wage income. The most important arrangements in this 
category are: 
- ZW Sickness benefits 
- WAO Disability benefits 
- WW/WWV Unemployment benefits 
3. Social provisions. No insurance principle is involved. Expenditures are wholly 
financed by general tax revenues. The most important social provisions are: 
- ABW Welfare 
- RWW Unemployment benefits 
In this paper the focus is on old-age pensions (AOW), disability pensions (AAW/WAO) 
and survivor pensions (AWW). The latter two schemes are investigated in this paper for 
persons over 55 years of age only. Benefits and premiums are as follows (situation 1985): 
- AOW Annual benefits are 13,760 guilders for an unmarried person, and 19,867 
guilders for a married couple, irrespective of the number of years 
worked. Premium is 11.7 percent of personal income. 
- AAW Maximum monthly benefits are equal to the legal minimum wage (minus 
holiday surplus), i.e. 1,988 guilders. A reduction is applied in case of 
partial disability. Premium is 6.1 percent of personal income. In case of 
gainful employment, premiums are paid by the employer. 
- WAO Benefits are at most equal to 93 percent of daily salary, depending on 
health situation of the individual. They are supplied to employees only. 
Persons eligible for AAW and WAO generally receive WAO-benefits 
only. Premium is 15.05 percent of a part of the gross salary, to be paid 
by the employee. No premiums are levied over the first 91 guilders per 
day, or over salary portions exceeding 262 guilders per day. 
- AWW Benefits are supplied to widows above age 40, and widows with 
unmarried children. At age 65, the pension is changed into old-age 
pension (AOW). Widows with unmarried children receive 19,867 guilders 
per year, widows without children receive 13,922 guilders per year. 
Contributions are 1.35 percent of personal income. 
Pension premiums are not levied over total income, but over the so-called premium 
income only. This premium income is found by taking the annual tax income (which is 
often lower than the annual gross salary), and subtracting an amount between 7,000 and 
14,000 guilders, depending on the household situation of the individual. It cannot exceed 
a certain maximum (around 52,000 guilders per person per year for disability pensions, 
and 63,000 guilders for old-age and survivor pensions). When one takes average annual 
incomes into consideration (47,000 guilders for males and 33,100 guilders for females), 
and compares these with total contributions for old-age pensions, disability pensions and 
survivor pensions (23.570 million, 18.701 million, and 2.823 million guilders, respectively, 
see the Statistisch Zakboek 1987, p. 350), the effective premium rate for the three 
schemes taken together would be 17.66 percent (the labor force in 1985 is 3.915 million 
males and 2.154 million females). 
From an international point of view, the flat rate pension system, in which old-age 
benefits are independent of the number of years worked, is rather exceptional. (There 
is one exception, however: immigrants who entered the Netherlands at age 15 or beyond 
will have a 2 percent reduction of the benefits for each year between their 15th birthday 
and their 65th birthday during which they lived outside the country.) When the current 
AOW scheme was introduced in the Netherlands in 1958, female labor force 
participation was extremely low (it was 16 percent in 1960), and any substantial increase 
was not foreseen (due to some specific cultural factors, see Section 4). Thus a work- 
history related scheme would not be appropriate in the Dutch context in the 1950s. As 
we shall see in the next section, even nowadays female labor force participation is still 
so low, that women would be disfavored. 
4. Developments in Size and Age Structure in the Labor Market, 1971-1989 
Despite the economic recession which struck the Netherlands in the 1970s (as in many 
other industrialized countries), the working population increased between 1971 and 1979 
from 4.8 million to 5.0 million persons. Around 1980, unemployment started to grow 
quickly, resulting in a decrease in the working population. However, in the second half 
of the 1980s, better economic conditions accompanied a strong increase in the working 
population, which reached a level of 5.5 million in 1988' (see Figure 4). The labor force, 
which is comprised of the working and the unemployed population, rose even stronger; 
it reached 6.2 million persons in 1988, whereas it was only 5.0 million in 1975. 
The rise in the working population was largely caused by an increase in the population 
aged 15-64. Except for the early 1980s, the overall activity rate (defined as the ratio of 
 round 1985, the definition of the working population changed. The effect was that around 
200,000 persons recorded unemployed so far, were included in the working population according to 
the new definition (SZW, 1989, p. 21). 
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Figure 4. Labor force, employed (working) population and registered unemployment. 
N.B. Source: NCBS (1989, pp. 76-81). Observed figures are indicated with an asterisk, estimated figures with 
a dot. Before the year 1977, the labor force was not measured annually. Figures for the years 1947,1960, and 
1971 are taken from population censuses. For inter-census years, the labor force is estimated on the basis 
of piece-wise linear interpolation between census observations, and likewise for the period 1972-1976. The 
employed (working) population is calculated as the diierence between the labor force (observed or 
estimated) and the number of registered unemployed persons, for which annual observations exist from 1947 
onwards. See, however, also footnote 5 of this paper. 
the total labor force to the population aged 15 and over)6 displays a continuous decline 
during the period between 1960 (when it was 62 percent) and 1987 (58 percent). At the 
same time, part-time work gained considerable importance since 1960. Until the mid- 
60ne should be very careful with the overall LFPR as a measure of labor force participation in 
a situation where age-specific LFPR's and/or the age structure of the population are highly irregular. 
The overall activity rate is crude in the demographic sense. A rise in age-specific LFPR's for all ages 
may very well lead to a declining overall activity rate in an aging population, in particular for females 
in the Netherlands. The reason is that age-specific LFPR's for females are high at young ages, and 
relatively low at old ages. When the median age of the population aged 15 or more shifts towards ages 
where LFPR's are below the average, the overall activity rate may decrease, even when all age-specific 
LFPR's follow an upward trend. Standardization of the overall activity rate with a constant population 
age structure may help. Alternatively, for constant LFPR's, the overall activity just shows the aging of 
the labor force in an aging overall population. 
1970s, this phenomenon was almost absent in the Netherlands. At present, no less than 
55 percent of the females work part-time (situation as of 1987), but only 9 percent of the 
males. Among the countries of the OECD, the Netherlands has the highest share of 
women working part-time (together with Norway, where the figure is 56 percent). 
The labor force participation is very unevenly distributed over the age-classes. Moreover, 
strong differences between males and females can be noted. Figure 5 shows labor force 
participation rates (LFPR's), expressing the ratio between the labor force and the 
potential labor force (including students, disabled and retired persons, housewives, etc.) 
for males and females for the years 1971, 1980 and 1989. First of all one notes, since 
1971, a steady decrease in the LFPR's at young and at high ages, both for males and 
females. This may be explained by prolonged education for the age-group 15-19, and by 
early retirement and disability pensions for ages between 55 and 64. For females aged 
60-64, the LFPR fell almost by 50 percent between 1971 and 1989, whereas for males in 
that age group the LFPR in 1989 is less than one-third of its 1971-value! Second, labor 
force participation of females above age 25 is strikingly low, at least compared with other 
industrialized countries. For instance, beyond age 25 female LFPR's in Sweden and in 
the US are rather close to those for males - in the Netherlands they are much lower. To 
a large extent, it is the labor market behavior of married women, which accounts for the 
low female LFPR's - these women, much more so than in other industrialized countries, 
withdraw permanently from the labor market after childbearing. 
Why do married women in the Netherlands work so much less in the labor market than 
women in other industrialized countries? Two reasons can be given. 
First, until the 1960s, the traditional system of family norms was well preserved in Dutch 
society. It was a consequence of the emancipatory movement, starting already in the 17th 
and 18th centuries, among the religiously and economically oppressed Roman Catholic 
minority living in the Southern part of the country, who developed specifically Roman 
Catholic standards of ethics regarding the family and contraception. This resulted in a 
Catholic opposition to the use of contraception and a "...glorification of large families ..." 
(Van Poppel, 1985, p. 370), which lasted well into the 1950s. The Church's social 
program tried to mitigate the disintegration it associated wi;h industrialization. Married 
women were virtually prohibited from working in the new factories in the first decades 
of the 20th century, very often in agreement with Catholic factory owners. But also, and 
this is the second reason, the demand for female workers was relatively low, as the 
Netherlands didn't go through the First World War, during which large numbers of 
women in neighboring countries worked in factories. 
The result of these two factors was that during more than sixty years in the 20th century, 
facilities to combine motherhood with a career in the labor market received traditionally 
little attention in the Netherlands. The situation, although it has improved somewhat, is 
still worse than in other European countries. For instance, up to 1990, a Dutch mother 
could take fully-paid maternity leave during a period of 12 weeks only. Very recently, this 
period was extended to 16 weeks. In other EC-countries, maternity leave ranges from 12 
weeks (Greece, with 50 percent of the salary) up to 28 weeks (Denmark, 90 percent of 
the salary up to a certain maximum). Norway, Finland and Sweden have even more 
favorable arrangements. 
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Figure 5. Labor force participation rates, 1971, 1980 and 1989. 
5. Future Pension Expenditures: One More Scenario 
Future pension expenditures were calculated for the demographic developments in the 
five demographic scenarios. A sixth scenario was added, implying demographic trends as 
assumed in the Realistic scenario, but with different social security parameters. As was 
mentioned in Section 3, the social security system in the Netherlands is based on flat 
benefit rates for many types of social security (including old-age state pensions, disability 
pensions and survivor pensions), independent of the number of years worked. Because 
of this peculiarity of the Dutch system, an additional scenario called FRG Social Security 
was devised. It consists of benefits rates, the pension scheme and proportions of 
claimants among widow(er)s as they are used in the Benchmark scenario for the Federal 
Republic of Germany (applying to the situation in 1985). Other pension parameters, such 
as the average salary, the payroll tax rate, labor force participation rates and proportions 
retired are similar to those in the Netherlands' benchmark calculations. Thus a 
comparison between results of the FRG Social Security scenario and the Realistic 
scenario gives us the possibility to study the effects on total expenditures of an 
introduction of a state pension system which would be similar to that of Germany. 
The development over time of expenditures for old-age and survivor pensions in various 
scenarios is shown in Table 9. The results for 1985 agree quite well with official figures. 
The NCBS Statistisch Zakboek 1987 (p. 350) gives 22.904 million guilders for old-age 
pensions, and (p. 347) 16.809 million guilders for disability pensions. Some 41 percent 
of the latter sum are supplied to persons above age 55. This makes a total of 29.796 
million, to be compared with the 30.676 in Table 9. The official figure regarding survivor 
pensions expenditures (p. 350) is 2.614 million guilders. This is much higher than the 
figure of 1.517 million in Table 9. Two reasons can be given for the deviation. 
Firstly, official figures relate to gross expenditures, whereas the figures in Table 9 are 
obtained as a simple product of net-individual benefit and number of eligible persons. 
Van Imhoff and Keilman (forthcoming) estimate, on the basis of Personal Income 
Distribution data and Housing Demand Survey data, total net-benefits supplied for 
AWW to be 1.877-2.041 million guilders, depending on the data source chosen. Secondly, 
AWW benefits are supplied to widows between ages 40 and 65. For reasons of 
international comparison, widows under 55 are ignored in the present paper. These 
widows make up 35 percent of all widows between 40 and 65. When the figures of Van 
Irnhoff and Keilman are reduced by the latter percentage, we would obtain 1.251-1.361 
million guilders, which is fairly close to the 1.517 million in Table 9. What these 
comparisons demonstrate is that self-reported figures on income from social security 
sources are not very reliable - it urges to provide future trends in the form of index 
numbers only, not absolute levels. 
The trends shown in Table 9 are dramatic: with the current social security system, 
expenditures for public old-age, disability and survivor pensions together will, in 2030, 
most certainly be about twice as high as in 1985, irrespective of which demographic 
scenario would materialize. After that period, total expenditures will go down, but in the 
year 2050 they would still be about 50 to 100 percent higher than in the mid-1980s. This 
implies an average annual growth rate of 0.7 to 1.1 percent over a period of 65 years. 
The growth is particularly strong in the period between 2000 and 2030, with average 
rates of between 1.8 and 2.3 percent per year. 
Expenditures for survivor pensions exhibit a moderate development in the Benchmark, 
the Western and the Realistic scenarios: they will reach their maximum around 2015 (at 
a level which is 14-24 percent higher than in the base year), and subsequently decline (to 
some 65-95 percent of the 1985 value). The clear exceptions to this general trend are the 
Mortality scenario and the FRG Social Security scenario. In the Mortality scenario, the 
reduction of excess mortality of males will bring about a steady decline in survivor 
pensions. On average during the period 1985-2050, the fall will be 0.9 percent per year. 
But this decrease is insufficient to compensate for the increase in old-age pensions (1.5 
percent per year during the years 1985-2000, and even 2.4 percent per year in the period 
2000-2015!), because the latter pensions constitute the majority of total expenditures in 
Table 9. 
Table 9. Pension expenditures, the Netherlands, 1985-2050. 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
(in millions (index, 1985 = 100) 
of guilders) 
Benchmark old age' 30676 121 158 186 158 
survivors 15 17 100 124 117 95 
total 32193 120 157 183 155 
Mortality old age 30676 125 180 223 205 
survivors 15 17 89 8 1 7 1 57 
total 32193 123 175 215 198 
Western old age 30676 121 162 192 167 
survivors 15 17 98 114 98 67 
total 32193 120 159 188 162 
Realistic old age 30676 122 165 201 186 
survivors 15 17 99 115 106 84 
total 32193 121 163 197 181 
FRG Social old age 28 197 124 176 213 191 
Security2 survivors 6789 121 134 146 130 
total 34987 123 168 200 179 
Including disability pensions supplied to persons over 55 years of age. 
Based on an exchange rate of 110 Dutch guilders for 100 German marks. 
In a social security system similar to that of the FRG, old-age pension expenditures 
would exhibit the same trend as is the case with the current system in the Realistic 
scenario, but the expenditures would take off at a somewhat lower level. In addition, 
survivors pensions would be more than four times those in other scenarios, and they 
would grow continuously. The reason is that in the FRG, the survivor pensions to widows 
are much more important than in the Netherlands, where widows receive survivor 
pensions only until age 65, and from that age on old-age pension (irrespective of the 
number of years worked). For instance, Gomot and Prinz (1989, Table 11) indicate that 
survivor pension expenditures in the FRG are about half as large as those for old-age 
pensions, whereas in the Netherlands the corresponding proportion is less than one-tenth 
(the official figures quoted above give for the year 1985 a proportion of 11 percent). 
Thus an FRG social security system would imply more or less the same expenditures for 
old-age and survivor pensions together, as compared with the Realistic scenario. But the 
balance is very different: less old-age pensions, and more survivor pensions. 
Questions about the feasibility of the Dutch old-age and survivor pension system can only 
be answered when total expenditures are related to contributions from the working 
population. Assuming constant labor force participation rates, the total labor force would 
first grow with some 8-12 percent over the period 1985-2000, when relatively small 
cohorts (both in terms of numbers in these generations, and numbers working) born 
during the years 1920-1940 retire and are replaced by large cohorts born in the 1960s 
(see Table 10). But the fall in fertility after the mid-1960s implies a drop in the size of 
the labor force in the first few decades of the 21st century - first slowly, but next more 
rapidly, to 83-103 percent and 62-95 percent of the 1985 value in the years 2030 and 
2050, respectively. How can such a shrinking labor force generate increasing pension 
expenditures? Table 11 sheds some light on this issue. 
Table 10. Labor force, the Netherlands, 1985-2050. 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
in 1000s index, 1985 = 100 
Benchmark 
Fertility 
Mortality 
Western 
Realistic 
Table 11. Contributions 1985, and contributions/benefits ratio, 1985-2050, the 
Netherlands. 
Contributions Contributions/benefits ratio (x 100) 
1985 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
(in millions 
of guilders) 
Benchmark 45,093 140 126 89 64 6 1 
Fertility 45,093 140 126 91 72 83 
Mortality 45,093 140 123 81 5 6 49 
Western 45,093 140 127 90 62 53 
Realistic 45,093 140 129 94 70 70 
FRG Social 45,093 142 128 91 69 7 1 
Security1 
'~ased on an exchange rate of 110 Dutch guilders for 100 German marks. 
In 1985, contributions to old-age, disability and survivor pensions were 40 percent higher 
than benefits for these pensions (it should be noted that benefits are net amounts, and 
that they do not apply to widows and to disabled persons under 55 years of age - hence 
Table 11 gives a too optimistic picture). This situation of overfunding will gradually 
change, and underfunding takes place between 2000 and 2015 in all six scenarios. The 
two extreme situations are those described in the Fertility scenario, where underfunding 
will be limited to some 30 percent in 2030, and the Mortality scenario, in which nearly 
half of the pensions cannot be financed with the current system! 
It will be clear that future contributions are projected here with the implicit assumption 
that the National Income will remain constant. A situation with an economic growth of 
one or two percent annually would, of course, alter the picture drastically, provided that 
benefits remain at their 1985 levels. In case benefits would follow economic growth, both 
contributions and benefits have to be multiplied with the same factor, and the 
contributions/benefits ratio would be the same as in Table 11. When contributions would 
follow economic growth, while benefits would stay at their 1985 levels, the economic 
situation of beneficiaries would deteriorate steadily, and they would be pushed more and 
more towards the lower deciles of the income distribution curve. From a social policy 
point of view, such a situation would be hard to justify. In reality, net-old-age pensions 
follow the same trend as the net-social minimum income. This relationship, which is 
known as the so-called net-net-link, implies an automatic negative feedback from 
contributions to benefits. When premiums have to be adjusted upwards in order to cope 
with higher financial burdens for old-age pension expenditures, the net-social minimum 
income will go down, and thus the net-benefit from old-age pensions will go down. In 
turn, this may lead to a higher demand for collective and private supplementary pensions. 
Benefits for collective supplementary old-age pensions take nearly half as much of the 
Net National Income as public old-age pensions: for the year 1985 the shares were 3.5 
percent and 6.1 percent, respectively. The projections presented here suggest that the 
sum of these two shares will rise in the future, and that collective (as well as private) old- 
age pensions will become more important. 
Because the demographic scenarios point to a situation of underfunding in the 21st 
century, with little variation between these scenarios, the conclusion emerges that 
changes in the demographic conditions, such as an increase in the average number of 
children, or a persistent influx of immigrants, cannot prevent funding problems for the 
Dutch social security system. To solve these problems, changes in the system itself have 
to be pursued. Linking pension benefits to the labor history of potential beneficiaries 
probably doesn't bring much relief, as the findings for the FRG Social Security scenario 
indicate. Therefore, two additional scenarios were devised: one with higher labor force 
participation (which would increase contributions), and one with a raise in the 
pensionable age (which would increase contributions, and at the same time bring benefits 
down). 
6. A Labor Market Scenario and a Retirement Scenario 
The GDR scenario assumes that by the year 2005, both males and females would follow 
the pattern of high labor force participation observed in the German Democratic 
Republic in 1985. In the 65 scenario it is assumed that the age at retirement is 
progressively raised to 65 by the year 2005 for both males and females. (The mean age 
at retirement is estimated to be 59.2 for males and 57.5 for females (see Gonnot and 
Prinz, 1989, p. 10). Due to early retirement and disability this age is lower than the legal 
pensionable age of 65.) This scenario also implies that no survivor pensions are served 
under age 60, and that labor force participation for the age groups between 55 and 65 
is shifted upwards to agree with the minimum pension age of 65. All other parameters 
for social security and for demographic conditions are maintained at their benchmark 
levels. 
The likelihood of these two scenarios is very hard to assess. Firstly, the relatively high 
labor force participation rates that are observed in the GDR in 1985 may partly be the 
result of hidden unemployment. It is very unlikely that these rates will remain at those 
high levels after the major transition that is taking place in the German economy at 
present. On the other hand, LFPR's in Finland in 1989 are even higher than those in the 
GDR in 1985, and in Norway and Sweden they are only slightly lower. Secondly, the 
current high level of unemployment in the Netherlands is not likely to diminish rapidly 
during the next twenty years or so, even under favorable economic conditions. This 
means that one of the consequences of high female labor force participation will be 
increased unemployment, both for females and for males. Thirdly, it is not at all certain 
that Dutch women will quickly adopt the GDR pattern. A number of factors, both inside 
and outside the labor market, may impede a quick rise in the labor supply of females 
(Keilman, 1991). According to international standards, facilities related to day-care and 
maternity leave, which are intended to combine motherhood with a job, are pretty poor 
in the Netherlands, as was mentioned in Section 4. Furthermore, a mere substitution of 
(decreasing numbers of young) male workers by (increasing numbers of) female workers 
is not without problems. Many occupations are traditionally dominated by males, and 
these are not easily accessible for women. Nevertheless, in most studies regarding the 
future composition of the labor force, some rise of female labor force participation rates 
is assumed. On the basis of the previous discussion it will be clear that future levels are 
to a certain extent arbitrary. 
As far as retirement is concerned, it should be noted that raising the pensionable age 
opposes the current trend. Yet some concern has been expressed already over the fact 
that early retirement becomes more widespread in the Netherlands, with a steadily 
decreasing age at retirement. Two problems are mentioned in this respect: the costs 
connected with early retirement, and the shortages in the labor market which are 
foreseen for some occupational groups in the future. A rise in the age at retirement 
would have to be obtained through an appropriate reduction of the probabilities for the 
older segments to leave the labor force. It would be natural to suppose that such a 
higher mean age at retirement would be based upon a flexible retirement scheme, in 
which the individual worker could decide to stop working between ages 60 and 75, say, 
rather than at the fixed age of 65, as is the case now in the Netherlands. It may be 
assumed that many of the present eldest workers, especially those in construction and 
heavy industry, would be confronted with large physical problems if the legal age of 
retirement would be fixed at 70 years, for example. Indeed, indications for hidden 
disability have been found among early retirees in the Netherlands (Henkens and 
Siegers, 1990). Thus, we assume that under the 65 scenario the pensionable age becomes 
65 on average, with some workers retiring earlier, and others later. 
In general, the two additional scenarios should be interpreted the same way as the other 
scenarios: they are conditional statements of what will happen if input variables to the 
model would develop according to these scenarios. They sketch a possible future, not 
necessarily a plausible one (except for the realistic one). 
Table 12 indicates that in the GDR scenario the labor force would show an enormous 
growth during the first one or two decades of the projection period. For instance, in the 
year 2000 it would be more than 40 percent larger than in the mid-1980s. The rise is 
particularly strong for women, for whom the index is no less than 181 in 2000. This is 
also reflected in the overall activity rate shown in the lower panel of Table 12. This 
indicator is defined as the ratio of the total labor force to the population aged 15 and 
over. 
Table 12. Labor force and overall activity rate, the Netherlands, 1985-2050. 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
(in 1000s) (index, 1985 = 100) 
Labor force 
Benchmark 6070 108 100 83 67 
Fertility 6070 108 102 94 94 
Mortality 6070 108 101 85 69 
Western 6070 109 103 84 62 
Realistic 6070 112 112 103 95 
GDR 6070 144 135 114 92 
65 6070 119 114 97 79 
Overall activity rate (%) 
Benchmark Males 
Females 
Fertility Males 
Females 
Mortality Males 
Females 
Western Males 
Females 
Realistic Males 
Females 
GDR Males 
Females 
65 Males 
Females 
In the GDR scenario, an average woman would have worked 37 years in the year 2000, 
whereas the corresponding figure in the Benchmark scenario would only have been 23 
years. For males the average number of years worked would be 45.6 in the GDR 
scenario, which is 7 years more than the Benchmark value. Moderate rises in the labor 
force, with very little differences between the sexes, can be noted in the 65 Scenario. 
Increased labor force participation and a raise in the retirement age have strong effects 
upon the ratio between benefits and contributions for the first forty years or so. Table 
13 demonstrates the huge impact of these two alternative labor market scenarios. The 
65 Scenario appears to be the most favorable from a funding perspective, with an 
overfunding of almost 100 percent by the year 2000. Increased labor force participation 
has a more moderate effect, because benefits are not related to the work history of the 
beneficiary. Yet its impact is considerable, compared with the Benchmark and the 
Realistic scenario. However, in the long run, underfunding cannot be avoided in the 
GDR and the 65 Scenario either, although the results suggest that a combination of the 
two scenarios probably could. Whether such a combination is feasible in the Dutch labor 
market is questionable, at least in the short run. 
Table 13. Contributions/benefits ratio, 1985-2050, the Netherlands (x 100). 
Benchmark 140 126 89 64 6 1 
Fertility 140 126 9 1 72 83 
GDR 140 164 118 85 8 1 
65 140 199 149 103 94 
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